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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
vs.
No. 19779
THOMAS LAYTON MASTBAUM
and KATHLEEN MARIE MASTBAUM,
Defendants and
Appellants.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the decision of the First
Judicial District Court granting plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment, concluding that plaintiff, as a matter of law, has no
responsibility to defend its insured, Mr. Mastbaum, against a
negligence action brought by his wife.
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment was granted on
the grounds that (1) the negligence action was barred by the
doctrine of interspousal tort immunity, and (2) that the policy's
family exclusion clause is not violative of public policy or the
policy behind the Utah Safety Responsibility Act.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks to have the Order of Summary Judgment
affirmed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants, Thomas Layton Mastbaum and Kathleen Marie
Mastbaum, are husband and wife, and are residents of Cache
County, Utah.

On May 30, 1981, defendants were returning to

their home in Cache County after spending the day at Bear Lake in
Rich County, Utah.

Shortly after defendants started up Logan

Canyon, they were involved in an automobile accident. Mrs.
Mastbaum was injured in this collision and seeks relief from the
plaintiff, State Farm Mutual, her husband's insurer.
Section 1, "LIABILITY COVERAGE", of the insurance policy
involved, specifically provides for certain exclusions.

The

exclusion in question clearly states the following:
THIS INSURANCE DOES NOT APPLY UNDER: (h)
COVERAGE A ["Bodily injury sustained by
other persons"], TO BODILY INJURY TO ANY
INSURED OR ANY MEMBER OF THE FAMILY OF AN
INSURED RESIDING IN THE SAME HOUSEHOLD AS
THE INSURED. (Emphasis contained in
policy)
Defendants claim that this exclusion is violative of
public policy in general, and violative of the public policy
behind the Utah Safety Responsibility Act, Utah Code Annotated
§30-2-4, and the Utah Constitution (Article I, Section II).
Defendants also claim that the doctrine of interspousal tort
immunity is violative of public policy.
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment was granted on
the grounds that (1) the negligence action was barred by the
doctrine of interspousal tort immunity, and (2) that the policy's
family exclusion clause is not violative of public policy or the

policy behind the Utah Safety Responsibility Act.

(Article I,

Section II) .
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
KATHLEEN MARIE MASTBAUM'S SUIT AGAINST HER
HUSBAND, THOMAS LAYTON MASTBAUM, IS BARRED
BY THE DOCTRINE OF INTERSPOUSAL TORT
IMMUNITY.
At common law, it was considered that upon marriage, the
wife, as the legal entity, merged with her husband; that her person and property became his, that any recovery for injury to her
belonged to him, that any suit had to be brought in his name.
Admittedly, the idea of the spouse's legal entity in the husband
is no longer accepted -- all jurisdictions now grant the wife a
separate entity from that of her husband.

Many jurisdictions

have taken this idea one step further by abolishing the doctrine
of interspousal tort immunity.

However, this is not the case in

Utah where the doctrine is currently the law in situations
involving negligent tortious conduct.
Utah still adheres to the doctrine of interspousal tort
immunity in suits involving negligent tortious conduct.

In

Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 384 P.2d 389 (1963), the
Utah Supreme Court noted the two most widely accepted public
policy grounds for retaining the doctrine:

(1) preserving family

harmony and the solidarity of the family unit, and (2) that "where
insurance is involved, because of the common interest a spouse
would have in the outcome, collusion would be encouraged."

Id.

at 390.
According to the court in Rubalcava, jurisdictions which
disallow interspousal tort immunity have done so by arguing that:
Since the insurance company, and not the
defendant, will have to pay, the family
exchequer will not suffer so much by
allowing the action as by denying it, so
the family harmony will not be harmed but
may be served by allowing the action. Id,
at 390-391 .
The Utah Supreme Court rejected such logic stressing
that:
The fact cannot be ignored that where
there is insurance, and this is known to
both parties, the temptation to collusion
exists; and this is increased when the
supposedly adverse parties are in the symbiotic relationship of husband and wife.
The risk of loss, and the natural reaction
to defend against the charge of wrong, may
be negligible or non-existent; and are
supplanted by the covert hope of mutual
benefit. ^Id. at 391 .
To further support the above, the Rubalcava court cited Brown v.
Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953), and quoted Justice Simms as
stating that to allow interspousal tort actions
encourages raids on insurance companies
through unmeritorious claims which never
would be instituted where the husband did
not carry liability insurance, thus
possibly raising insurance rates on
thousands of honest persons for the benefit of the fraudulent few. Id. 391-392.
In addressing the argument regarding the disruption of
family harmony, the Rubalcava court found that because the
insurance company was in actuality the opposing party, marital
harmony would not be endangered.

In so stating, the court found:

The argument that domestic felicity will
not be impaired when the insurance company
is to pay seems to lose sight of the principle that collusion itself is something
dishonest to be guarded against. We
assume that it will be agreed that the
objective of a fair and just determination
is not to be subverted by providing an
easy means for a discordant pair to unite
happily in collusion against a third party
simply for the sake of marital harmony.
More fundamental ethical thinking will
demonstrate that this ultimately would not
serve the cause of household concord
anyway. If spouses join in dishonest chicanery against the third party, this would
weaken the foundation of their relationship because when troubles arise, as
they always do in marriage, the parties
would then suspect each other's integrity.
Rubalcava v. Gisseman, supra, at 392.
Therefore, Rubalcava maintains that public policy arguments strongly favor retention of interspousal tort immunity.

In

addition, the court expressly stated that any changes in this
important area will have to be made by the legislature.

I_d. at

393.
A more recent case to challenge Utah's stance on interspousal tort immunity was Hull vs. Silver, 577 P.2d 103 (Utah
1978).

This case involved a wrongful death action filed by the

administrator of the estate of Marilyn Hull Silver, on behalf of
Mrs. Silver1s heirs, against the estate of Lynn R. Silver, her
husband.
Mr.

The couple had been killed when an airplane piloted by

Silver had crashed.

The trial court granted the defendant's

motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiff appealed.

In

reversing the trial court's decision, the Utah Supreme Court
acknowledging it's decision in Rubalcava v. Gisseman, supra.,

stated that, "It should be the purpose of the law to protect
family solidarity... ."

However, the court determined that the

doctrine of interspousal tort immunity would not apply to this
particular fact situation, in that both spouses were dead and the
conventional family unit had been destroyed.

Because of the

those facts, "there is no marital harmony that needs protection,
and there is no possibility of collusion." Hull vs. Silver,
supra., at 103.
of Rubalcava.

Clearly, this is distinguishable from the facts

Thus, the public policy arguments for retaining

the doctrine still apply in cases where both spouses are alive
for the preservation of marital harmony and to guard against
collusion.
The most recent Utah case to address this issue is
Stoker vs. Stoker, 616 P.2d 590 (Utah 1980).

This was an action

brought by a woman against her former husband for injuries
alleged to have been intentionally inflicted on her prior to the
divorce of the parties.

By a 3 to 2 decision, the court held

that the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity should not apply
to intentional torts. However, the court's decision was abrogating immunity as to intentional torts only:
This does not mean that a husband or wife
can recover from the other for any
unwanted caress, kiss, or other physical
contact as sometimes claimed. The
marriage relation is created by the consent of both of the parties; inherently
within such relationship is the consent of
both parties to physical contact with the
other, personal dealings and ways of
living which would be unpermitted and in
some cases unlawful as between other per-

sons. The essential objects and purposes
of marriage such as living together,
creating a home and rearing a family are
expected and consented to by husband and
wife but would be unlawful and in some
instances even criminal as between other
persons. Under some circumstances such
consent might be withdrawn and thereafter
would not prevent civil liability from
occurring, but until that happens the
ordinary dealings between husband and wife
are with the consent of both and do not
create liability between them. However,
this does not mean that either husband or
wife consents to intentionally inflicted
serious personal injuries by the other.
Id. at 592, citing Taylor v. Patten, 2 Utah
404, 408, 275 P.2d 696, 699 (1954) (emphasis
added)
Even though this decision did not abrogate interspousal tort
immunity as to negligent torts, Chief Justice Crockett (joined by
Justice Hall) in the dissenting opinion indicated that the
decision nonetheless "constitutes an abrupt change in our law
which has the potential for far reaching effects."

I_d.

Chief

Justice Crockett also echoed the decision in Rubalcava v.
Gisseman, supra, that if there were to be such a "diametric
change, it should not be by judicial legislation, but by the
legislature, whose prerogative and responsibility it is to
fashion and decide such policies."

Id.

Finally, the dissent wisely pointed out that:
At the very least, if there is to be a
change by any means, it should have only
prospective effect in order to avoid
disruptive and unjust impact on contractual obligations and insurance programs
which have been entered into based upon
the present state of our law. Id.
Clearly, Utah has retained the doctrine of interspousal

tort immunity, carving out an exception only for intentional
torts.
Utah has followed those jurisdictions which have chosen
to decide the issue on a case-by-case basis rather than completely abolishing the doctrine.

Patrons Mutual Ins. Assoc, v.

Norwood, 647 P.2d 1335 (Kan. 1982), is an example of this
approach.
Patrons involved an automobile accident in which the
husband brought suit against his wife.

The husband made a claim

for uninsured motorist protection, arguing his wife, although
insured, was uninsured as to him because of interspousal immunity.

In his petition for declaratory judgment, the district

court found that Charles Norwood was a passenger and that he was
legally entitled to bring an action against Patrons Mutual
Insurance pursuant to the uninsured motorist provisions of the
policy.

Subsequently, Patrons appealed.

The issue was, "whether

the Kansas doctrine of interspousal immunity precludes recovery
of damages by a husband for personal injuries suffered in an
automobile accident caused by his wife's negligence where such
recovery is sought under the uninsured motorist provisions of a
liability policy issued to his wife."

I_d. at 1336.

In determining this issue, the court dealt with an
interpretation of the "legally entitled to recover" provision of
both the insurance policy and a Kansas statute.

In so dealing,

the court found, "Before an insured can recover under the uninsured motorist provisions of the insurance policy, that person

must show he or she is flegally entitled to recover1 damages from
the uninsured motorist."

The court then went on to construe the

phrase, "legally entitled to recover as damages" to mean:
[T]he insured must be able to establish
fault on the part of the uninsured
motorist which gives rise to damages and
to prove the extent of those damages.
This would mean that in a direct action
against the insurer the insured has the
burden of proving that the other motorist
was uninsured, and the amount of this
liability. In resisting the claim the
insurer would have available to it, in
addition to policy defenses compatible
with the statute, the substantive defenses
that would have been available to the
uninsured motorist such as contributory
negligence, etc. ^_d. at 1338*
Before reaching the issue of interspousal tort immunity,
this court examined the public policy reasons behind uninsured
motorist coverage and found:
If the purpose of the uninsured motorist
statute is to afford the same protection
to a person injured by an uninsured
motorist as he or she would have enjoyed
if the offending motorist had carried
liability insurance, it makes sense to
deny [the husband's] claim. Under the
doctrine of interspousal immunity he could
not have recovered from his wife regardless of whether she carried liability
insurance." Ld. 1340.
The court then reasoned:
[T]he foremost justification for immunity
is based on the premise that personal tort
actions between husband and wife would
disrupt and destroy the peace and harmony
of the home and this would be contrary to
the public policy of the state. I_d. 1340.
Subsequently, "in balancing the public policy of pro-

viding liability insurance coverage for all drivers against that
of preserving the peace and harmony of the home the court found
the former must give way.11

Therefore, the court concluded that

the husband was not legally entitled to "recover" damages from
his spouse and that the uninsured motorist provision of her
insurance policy did not apply.
Utah has chosen not to follow those jurisdictions which
have completely abolished the doctrine of interspousal immunity,
chosing rather to apply the doctrine in those cases where there
are strong policy reasons for retaining it.
The situation that lends itself most to the retention
of the doctrine is in those cases where both parties have an
interest in collecting insurance.
The present case is an example of the type of case where
the doctrine should be retained.

Mr. and Mrs. Mastbaum both have

a direct economic interest in recovering from State Farm.

Thus,

there can be no true adversary proceeding in determining the
issues of liabiLity or damages.

It is to Mr. Mastbaum1s interest

to agree with his wife's position and to do everything possible
to see that she recovers the highest judgment available.
This is already evident in the present case. Mr.
Mastbaum filed an affidavit in the lower court admitting all of
the elements sufficient to overcome the guest statute defense
which was in effect at the time of this accident.
Mr.

Thus, because

Mastbaum will benefit from any judgment his wife is seeking,

he is really an adversary to his own defense and to the insurance

company that would be obligated to provide the same if the
doctrine of interspousal immunity and the household exclusion of
the policy are not given validity.
It is not enough to say that our court system can
resolve such issues.

That proposition ignores reality.

legal system is founded upon its adversarial nature.

The

Without

which, the checks and balances necessary for justice are lost.
In realty the insurance company which would be required to defend
Mr. Mastbaum would be denied his cooperation, therefore subverting justice.
POINT II.
THE FAMILY EXCLUSION CLAUSE CONTAINED IN
PLAINTIFF'S INSURANCE POLICY IS A VALID
AND ENFORCEABLE PROVISION AND DOES NOT
VIOLATE PUBLIC POLICY UNDER UTAH LAW.
Whether family exclusion clauses provided for in
liability insurance policies violate public policy has been
answered directly by the Utah Supreme Court.

In State Farm

Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Kay, 26 Utah 2d 195, 487 P.2d 852
(1971), the plaintiff, State Farm Mutual, initiated a declaratory
judgment action to determine its liability and duty to afford a
defense to its insured, Myrtle L. Kay, under an automobile
liability policy.

Mrs. Kay had been the driver in a one car

rollover in which her son, Richard Kay, had been severely
injured.

As had been done in the present action, Mr. Kay

asserted that the family exclusion clause was void as a matter of
public policy.

In rejecting this claim, the court quoted exten-

sively from a factually similar case, State Farm Mutual Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 2 Wash.App. 169, 467 P.2d 189, 193-194
(1970):
The majority rule upholds the validity and
application of exclusionary provisions in
factual situations substantially similar
to the facts in the present case. See 50
A.L.R.2d 108, at 120; 50 A.L.R.2d 110,
Later Case Service. A review of the
numerous cases therein cited leads this
court to the conclusion that in considering the construction of any exclusionary clause in a liability insurance
policy, the purpose and intent of the
insurer in inserting the particular clause
must be considered. The exclusion in
question is a so-called 'household or
family exclusionary clause,1 the purpose
of which is not to protect insurers from
collusion which might possibly arise in
intrafamily suits, but also to protect
them from the natural tendency of one
insured to strengthen or enlarge the case
against him when it involves members of
his household and family. There is a
natural disposition to favor those in
one's household and close members of one's
family. The practical impossibility
facing an insurer in defending such an
action is readily apparent, and explains
why this type of exclusion is inserted in
a policy . . . .
at 856.
Based on the above, the court in State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co.
v. Kay, supra, at 856, held that Richard Kay was within the
exclusionary clause, which does not violate public policy.
Following this decision, Richard Kay then sued his
mother, and joined the insurer based on the uninsured motorist
clause of the policy.

The Utah Supreme Court again rejected

Kay's claim and, in Kay v. Kay, 30 Utah 2d 94, 513 P.2d 1372
(1973), explained in even greater detail why the family exclusion

clause is not violative of public policy:
State Farm was contractually bound to provide liability coverage; however, there
was an exclusion. The household or family
exclusion is for the purpose of protecting
insurers from collusion which might arise
in intrafamily disputes and from the
natural tendency of the one insured to
strengthen or enlarge the case against him
when it involves members of his household
and family. The practical impossibility
facing an insurer in defending an action
of this type explains the necessity of
including an exclusion in the policy.
Since there is a valid public policy to
support this exclusion from liability
coverage, it would be nonsense for this
exclusion to constitute a ground to activate the substituted liability coverage
under uninsured motorist provisions. Id.
at 1373.
Again, as pointed out by the coiirt, the exclusion does
not violate public policy; on the contrary, it served two very
important public policies.

First, it helps avoid collusive suits

arising from intrafamily disputes, and secondly, it protects the
insurer from the impossible burden of defending a tortfeasor who
is not only related to the plaintiff, but who desires the plaintiff to prevail.
Finally, as stated above, "the majority rule upholds the
validity and application of exclusionary provisions . . . ."
State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Phillips, supra, citing 50
A.L.R.2d 108, at 120; see also 50 A.L.R.2d 110, Later Case
Service for numerous authorities cited.

POINT III.
THE HOUSEHOLD EXCLUSION CLAUSE NEITHER
VIOLATES THE PUBLIC POLICY BEHIND THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION (ARTICLE I, SECTION II) NOR
U.C.A. §30-2-4.
Article I, Section II of the Utah Constitution states as
follows:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him and his
person, property or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, which shall
be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be
barred from prosecuting or defending
before any tribunal in this state, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which
he is a party.
However, this is not a green light for a person to seek
enforcement of every conceivable remedy.

Even though Article I,

Section II does provide that "all courts shall be open11 a limitation is also included that remedies can only be had "by due
course of law."

The fact that past judicial decisions in this

state have limited access to the courts in several areas of the
law is too obvious to justify prolonged decision.

However, some

examples of such limitations are no-fault insurance cases (see,
e.g., Allstate Ens. Co. v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980);
Workers Compensation Cases (see, e.g., State Tax Comm. v. Dept.
of Finance, 576 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1978); and cases involving a
statute of limitations (see, e.g., Vealey v. Clegg, 579 P.2d 919
(Utah 1978).
The Utah Supreme Court explained Article I, Section II
in Brown v. Wightman, 47 Utah 31, 151 P. 366 (1915), as follows:

This [Article I, Section II] is the
general provision, which in the same or
similar language will be found in the
constitutions of at least 29 states in the
Union, . . The courts have, however,
always considered and treated those provisions, not as creating new rights, or as
giving new remedies where none otherwise
are given, but as placing a limitation
upon the legislature to prevent that
branch of the state government from
closing the doors of the court against any
person who has a legal right which is
enforceable in accordance with some known
remedy. Where no right of action is
given, however, or no remedy exists,
under either common law or some statute,
those constitutional provisions create
none. Id. at 366-367. (emphasis added)
This interpretation is still accepted today.

Since no

such remedy as here sought existed at common law, and since the
legislature has not created any such remedy or right, this section of the Constitution is wholly inapplicable to the present
action.
U.C.A. §30-2-4, which defendant also relies upon, provides as follows:
A wife may receive the wages for her personal labor, maintain an action therefor
in her own name and hold the same in her
own right, and may prosecute and defend
all actions for the preservation and
protection of her rights and property as
if unmarried. There shall be no right of
recovery by the husband on account of personal injury or wrong to his wife, or for
expenses connected therewith, but the wife
may recover against a third person for
such injury or wrong as if unmarried, and
such recovery shall include expenses of
medical treatment and other expenses paid
or assumed by the husband.
Again, the Utah Supreme Court has addressed this issue

-1 R_

in relationship to exclusion clauses.

In Rubalcava v. Gisseman,

supra, the court explained that:
[Section 4], which states that she may
'prosecute and defend all actions for the
preservation and protection of her rights
and property as if unmarried,1 provides
the foundation for the action. However,
careful reading shows that . . . [this
section] is referring only to her wages
and property rights. Following this
authorization the latter section refers to
the right of recovery for injury to her
person:
'There shall be no right of recovery by
the husband on account of personal injury
or wrong to his wife. . . but the wife
may recover against the third person for
such injury or wrong as if unmarried. . .
.' [As in original] This language simply
takes from the husband the right of action
for injury to the wife and gives it to
her. Since the husband and wife are the
only two persons mentioned, the authorization of the wife to recover 'against the
third person' can only reasonably be
interpreted as against someone other than
the husband. We are unable to find in
this section, either expressly or by
implication, any authority for the wife to
sue her husband in tort. But as we read
the language, its plain import is to the
contrary; and the authorization to sue a
third person clearly manifests that the
section was formulated in an awareness
that no right to sue the husband existed.
Id. 393. (emphasis added)
Some confusion on this issue was recently created in
Stoker v. Stoker, supra.

After citing U.C.A. §30-2-4, the court

stated that:
The statute authorizes her to prosecute
and defend all actions for the preservation and protection of her rights and
property, as if unmarried. It speaks of
rights and of property in the disjunctive,

_i £ _

and, all actions for the preservation and
protection of her rights would certainly
include a right to be free from an intentional tort of her husband. Ijl. 591 •
Even though this section was only cited as support for the proposition that a wife can sue her husband for an intentional tort,
Chief Justice Crockett (with Justice Hall concurring) stated the
following in the dissenting opinion:
It is my opinion that one will search in
vain for any authorization for a wife to
sue her husband in a tort claim.
*

*

*

It is significant to focus attention
upon the fact, that in prescribing the
rights the wife has to recover on account
of personal injuries, the just quoted section [30-2-4] mentions both husband and
wife; and that it authorizes the latter to
recover only against a third person,
pointedly omitting any reference to suing
the husband. Equally important and persuasive, it does nothing about authorizing
the husband to sue a wife. Under the main
opinion's reasoning, this statute leaves
an illogical and unjust hiatus in the law.
It could hardly be more obvious than that
no such incongruous result was intended;
and that the plain meaning and intent is
to authorize a suit only as against a
third person and has nothing to do with
authorizing a suit against the husband.
Chief Justice Crockett then concluded that:
If the legislature had intended to create
a cause of action, or to recognize the
right of a wife to sue her husband in
tort, it would and should have done so in
those statutes which specifically set
forth each of the several rights which the
wife does have to bring such suits for the
protection of her interests, her person,
and her property. In the absence of
having done so, it is to my mind inesca-

pably clear that there is no such statutory authority for the wife to maintain
such a cause of action against her husband. I_cL 593, 594. (emphasis added)
This opinion has been supported by most states that
adhere to the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity.

Most of

these jurisdictions have followed the general principle mentioned
by Chief Justice Crockett that statutes are not deemed to repeal
the common law unless the legislative intent to do so is clearly
manifested.
(1955).

See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 205 Or. 286, 187 P.2d 572

See also, 92 A.L.R.3d 901 at 912 to 917 for extensive

citing from other jurisdictions.
Stoker v. Stoker, supra, must be applied to the limited
fact situation of that case; that of an intentionally inflicted
tort.

The reasoning for this is obvious -- where the peace and

harmony of a home have already been strained to the point that a
physical attack could take place, domestic tranquility and family
solidarity would not be further impaired by allowing a suit to be
brought to recover damages for the attack.
However, the same reasoning does not apply to negligent
torts.

As in the present case, tortious acts stemming from

negligence can, and very often do, occur in homes where there is
marital harmony and domestic tranquility to protect.

In short,

the public policy considerations, and thus the laws which should
be applied are completely different when comparing intentional
and negligent torts.
The determination of this issue will be important not
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only for automobile liability cases but also in other negligence
actions where the insurance policies have family exclusion provisions.

Most homeowner policies have similar exclusions and since

a majority of accidents occur in the home, a decision striking
the exclusion would have far reaching and very serious consequences -- should there be tort lability among family members for
such common "negligence11 as failing to properly remove snow and
ice from sidewalks?

It is submitted that the first party bene-

fits now available in existing insurance contracts are sufficient
protection for family members.

The legislature has wisely chosen

not to expand the rights of family members to include the proposed tort liability because the adversary system is not preserved in such a case as explained earlier in this brief.
POINT IV.
THE FAMILY EXCLUSION CLAUSE INVOLVED DOES
NOT VIOLATE THE PUBLIC POLICY BEHIND THE
UTAH SAFETY RESPONSIBILITY ACT.
Defendant has claimed that the household exclusion
clause violates the public policy behind the Utah Safety
Responsibility Act.

Presumably, this assertion stems from

§41-12-21.1 U.C.A. (1953, as amended), which provides that:
Commencing on July 1, 1967, no automobile
liability insurance policy . . . shall be
delivered . . . unless coverage is provided in such policy or supplement to it,
in limits for bodily injury or death set
forth in Section 41-12-5, under provisions
filed with and approved by the State
Insurance Commission for the protection of
persons insured thereunder who are legally
entitled to recover damages from owners or

operators of uninsured motor vehicles. . .
because of bodily injury . . . resulting
therefrom. . . .
However, in Kay v. Kay, supra, the Utah Supreme Court,
after noting that the insurance company was contractually bound
to provide liability insurance, then pointed out that:
Since there is a valid public policy to
support this exclusion from liability
coverage, it would be nonsense for this
exclusion to constitute a ground to activate the substituted liability coverage
under the uninsured motorist provisions.
The uninsured motorist coverage would
become a device to nullify household
exclusion clauses. There is nothing in
the Safety Responsibility Act that mandates such a result. Id. at 1373.
"("emphasis added)
Other jurisdictions have also held that household exclusions are valid as against the contention that they violate
financial responsibility laws.

See, e.g., Linehan v. Alkahabbaz,

398 So.2d 989 (Fla.App. 1981); Porter v. Farmer's Ins. Co., 102
Idaho 132, 627 P.2d 311 (1981).

However, courts are admittedly

divided on this issue.
In Allstate Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co., 619 P.2d 329 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court
did hold that a named driver exclusionary endorsement to an automobile liability policy was void and unenforceable to the extent
of the mandatory statutory minimum insurance coverage of $15,000
provided in the Utah Safety Responsibility Act, but was otherwise
enforceable.

The public policy reasons supporting the household

exclusion provision are, of course, substantially different than
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the named driver exclusionary endorsement.

Thus, the foregoing

Allstate decision is not dispositive of the present case.
It is clear from the wording in §41-12-21.1 that the
purpose of that section is to protect the public in general from
uninsured motorists and not to protect a person from his or her
spouse whose policy contains the household exclusion clause.
There is, however, some plausibility to the argument that if a
household exclusion clause is enforced, the passenger would be
excluded from the policy and thus, as to him, the driver would be
an uninsured motorist.
This is much the same situation as existed in Kay v.
Kay, supra.

In a concurring opinion in that case, Justice

Crockett acknowledged the apparent conflict raised by this argument:

On the one hand, the extension of coverage to passengers

injured by an "uninsured motorist," on the other hand, the exclusion of family members, Justice Crockett explained that:
The problem to be confronted and resolved
here is: which of the two provisions
stated above should be given priority. In
order to determine that question it is
proper to look at the entire contract; and
which provisions appear to be overlapping
or in conflict, to give them weight and
priority in accordance with the main
thrust and purpose of the contract; and
this sometimes involves consideration of
public policy. [citations omitted]
We should proceed upon the assumption,
as noted above, that the main purpose of
the taking out and issuance of the policy
was that Myrtle Kay would be an "insured
motorist;" and that she in fact had in
force a policy in conformity with the law.
The exclusion as to coverage as to members

of the family is an essential and well
justified exclusion, for reasons stated in
the main opinion. As compared to this:
The coverage for injury caused by an
"uninsured motorist11 is a comparably recent
innovation in insurance and in law, and its
general purpose was to extend insurance to
take care of injuries resulting from accidents with other cars where there was no
insurance coverage. If the plaintiff's
contention were accepted, it would result
in this extension of coverage defeating
the primary purpose of the policy which
was to make his mother Myrtle Kay an
"insured motorist," and would render
meaningless the reasonable and justified
exception as to "members of the family."
Id. at 1374. (emphasis added)
As in the Kay case, further weight and persuasion is
given to this conclusion in the present case in that the policy
involved clearly provides in the "definitions" section that:
. . . The term uninsured motor vehicle
shall not include: (i) a vehicle defined
herein as an insured motor vehicle . . . .
The car which was driven by the insured, Thomas Mastbaum, is the
automobile described in his policy as the insured vehicle.
Justice Crockett concluded that:
It is ray judgment that when the entire
picture is analyzed in the light of what
has been said in the main opinion, and in
this supplement thereto, it cannot reasonably be concluded from the insurance
contract that the "uninsured motorist"
extended coverage was intended to defeat
the main purpose of the policy: That of
making the primary insured, Myrtle Kay, an
"insured motorist" nor of obviating the
express exclusion as to the members of the
family. I_d. at 1375.
This same reasoning is directly applicable to the present case.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the doctrine of interspousal tort
immunity bars Mrs. Mastbaumfs suit against her husband.

The

public policy grounds for retention of this principle are clearly
applicable in the present case.

Also, as discussed herein, the

family exclusion clause contained in defendant's insurance policy
neither violates legislative pronouncement nor judicial precedent.

Indeed, past judicial decisions have clearly indicated

that such exclusions are valid and enforceable contractual
agreements.

Furthermore, the public policy grounds supporting

retention of the exclusionary clause clearly outweighs any detrimental effect which it might have.

For these reasons, this court

should retain the rule upholding enforceability of the household
and family exclusion clause.
Based on the undisputed facts of this case and the arguments stated herein, plaintiff prays that the ruling of the
district court be affirmed.
Dated this

/ 7

day of

J^ttf/

1984.
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